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which the following framework owes a great deal to.  
Further, I want to thank my supervisors Tore Nyhamar (05 / S -06) and Petter 
Nesser (05 / S-06) at Norwegian Defense Research Establishment for valuable 
discussions, structural and methodological guidance and counseling. Nesser, my 
main adviser in empirical questions has supplied invaluable assistance in the 
search for literature on the jihadi-Salafists. This said, any flaws - methodological, 
empirical or theoretical are my own responsibility.  
Finally, I want to thank my parents for financial assistance, my friend, sweetheart 
and antagonist Jeanette and of course my beloved children.  
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1. Introduction 
In this thesis I want to understand why people are drawn to violent Islamist 
groups. I will explore mechanisms1 that might radicalize Muslims and offer a 
framework, in which the socio-economic conditions2 in the Middle East are the 
triggering factor.  
In the following I will focus on jihadi-Salafists; including, but not limited to the 
group known as al-Qaida. This thesis recognizes jihadi-Salafists as individuals 
who maintain a literal interpretation of the sacred Islamic texts and champion a 
rearrangement of society along the lines of Muhammad’s medieval umma. These 
incentives are shared by the Salafi movement as a whole, both radicals and 
moderates, including i.a. the Saudi-Arabian Wahhabi School and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The jihadi-Salafists do however distinguish themselves by a 
seemingly radical reworking of the justification and application of the doctrine of 
jihad. In this context jihad denotes acts of violence justified by reference to 
Islamic principles.  
Even though the number of people turning to such extremities is relatively small, 
suicide attacks and the spearhead of the jihadi-Salafists, Osama bin Laden seem 
to have mass support. The Strategic Survey 2003/04 maintains that al-Qaida 
have regrouped and have funding and 18 000 possible activists available. It is 
probable that the ongoing war in Iraq have increased this number. Sverre 
Lodgaard (2004) points to an escalating development, and maintains that 
international terrorism has increased heavily since President George Bush 
declared war on terrorism.  
The thesis’ perspective stems from the conviction that the structural conditions in 
a given society are decisive in the propagation of radical oppositional groups.  
 
 
                                            
1 understood as “[…] specific causal pattern[s] that can be recognized after the event, but rarely 
foreseen” (Elster 1993: 3), 
2 In what follows socio-economic conditions and structural conditions will be used 
interchangeably. 
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2. Main Approach 
The main approach will be to map psychological mechanisms which might be 
effective in the process of making individuals receptive to the jihadi-Salafi 
ideology. 
Theories of political psychology view human behavior as a product of preceding 
experiences and structural conditions. In other words, how a person behaves is 
conditioned by the psychological effects of his or her previous experiences. My 
hypothesis is that the socio-economic conditions in the Middle East predispose 
Muslims to the jihadi-Salafi ideology.  
I will pursue this by employing four psychological mechanisms: adaptive 
preference formation, wishful thinking, feeling of resentment, inferential errors 
and the process of symbolization. All of these mechanisms are known to be 
caused by certain structural conditions. The method rests on the notion that the 
possible effects of these mechanisms correspond with the sentiments advocated 
by the jihadi-Salafists. 
 
The psychological mechanism known as the sour grapes syndrome will serve to 
illustrate the effect of the socio-economic conditions in the Middle East. In the 
renowned fable of Jean de La Fontaine, a fox decides that the grapes he can not 
reach are sour and thus not worth having. In the current context I will argue that 
some of the aversion towards Western style government and social order, stems 
from this mechanism; as the western world’s standard of living and individual 
freedom appear to be unattainable to people living in many Muslim countries, 
they react by opposing these values. As Jason Burke puts it: 
  
“[…] the experiences of a 17-year-old Pakistani middle-class youth, torn 
between the mullah and the MTV. If he accepts his desire to be part of the 
Westernized world he will have to address the fact that he is unlikely ever 
to enjoy anything more than an ersatz, inferior version of the ‘Western’ life 
enjoyed by his equivalent in London or Los Angeles. His clothes will never 
be as up to date, his skin will never be the right color, his chances of pre-
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marital sex will always be infinitesimally lower. An alternative course is to 
reject the West and all it stands for in favor of the affirming, empowering 
certainties of radical Islam” (Burke 2003: 246). 
 
Due to the extreme character of the jihadi-Salafists actions and their claim that 
their actions are sanctioned and prescribed by Allah, instrumental religion is 
included as the model’s third mechanism.  
The perspective of an instrumental utilization of Islam is theoretical; I find it to be 
a viable conceptualization in the context of this project. Whether or not the jihadi-
Salafists developed their ideology intentionally to lure Muslims to the jihad, or 
they actually believe their school of Islam is the only legitimate, true version of 
Allah’s will, is beyond the scope of this project. The behavioral pattern and 
history of top al-Qaida members, their communiqués and lack of narcissism 
(Sageman 2004: 172) as well as al-Qaida’s diametrically different structure and 
operational pattern compared to other “terrorist” leaders and organizations, does 
however  indicate strong religious incentives. 
 
2.1 Topical perspective 
The topical perspective of human behavior views it through the grid of rational 
choice theory. “This perspective assumes individuals to make a cost-benefit 
analysis of all available courses of action with respect to their consequences for 
the realization of the individual’s preferences” (Andeweg 2003: 26).This is an 
“ideal-type” definition of human behavior and it is recognized that most humans 
do not hold the cognitive capacities this perspective assumes. However as “on 
average, people behave ‘as if’ they are rational actors” (Andeweg 2003: 26), it is 
an adequate method to conceptualize human behavior. The rational choice 
perspective on human behavior can schematically be outlined like this:  
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Figure 2.1 Tentative model of human behavior 
 
 
According to this model, human action is viewed as a product of a tripartite 
process initiated by a formative period in which the psychological effects of 
experience affect an individual’s beliefs and desires.  
Consequently these desires motivate a person to behave in a certain way. This is 
behavior commonly referred to as maximizing behavior.  
The figure indicates a sequential process, and is a simplified illustration of the 
complex process of human behavior. Assessing a person’s incentives is much 
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like peeling an onion; provided the person is in good health and not suffering 
from any mental disorder, our experiences, the structural conditions one faces 
and the psychological effects of these affect our beliefs and desires continuously. 
The figure is thus a snapshot of the behavioral process, an accurate 
representation of the process would require the inclusion of recurring 
psychological effects.    
 
The main focus of this project is on the formative period (figure 2.1.) This is 
where incentives are created. I believe that psychological mechanisms might 
help explain why Muslims traveled to the camps in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 
1990s, sometimes begging for the chance to become Martyrs3, and why Muslims 
go to Iraq to wage holy war today.  
Which mechanisms spur people to engage in religious violence? 
This is the overall question of this project, and even though I hope to be able to 
offer a viable framework for understanding this, it will not cover all aspects of the 
phenomenon. However, I believe that the three mechanisms included: 
psychological -, symbolization and the instrumental use of religion are vital. The 
first two are triggered by socio-economic conditions, while the third the collective 
Islamic legacy, and thus they have the potential for affecting the entire Middle 
Eastern Muslim population.  
First, I argue that the psychological mechanisms adaptive preference formation, 
feeling of resentment, wishful thinking and inferential errors, outlined in chapter 
6.1., form the necessary condition in which the other mechanisms operate. 
These psychological effects predispose individuals to the jihadi-Salafi ideology.  
 
 
 
                                            
3 Martyr: a Muslim who dies fighting in the name of Allah. There is disagreement among Islamic 
scholars whether or not people who carry out suicide missions should be exalted to martyrs. The 
jihadi-Salafists (among others) do however use this method extensively and martyrize these 
individuals. As suicide is forbidden according to the Qur’an this is however arguably due to a 
convenient exegesis (refer section 5.3.) Bernhard Lewis points in the same direction when he 
claims that “Der Koran kennt keine selbstmordattentate” (Die Zeit 2004)  
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The additional mechanisms which will be included are: 
 
• Instrumental use of religion 
I intend to explore the notion of the jihadi-Salafi ideology as a blend of 
amendments to, and convenient exegesis of the Islamic sacred texts. One 
can justly call the attention to the fact that all religious thought is subject 
to, and a product of, exegesis and thus render this mechanism void. It is 
further no criterion for religious belief to be logically coherent, rather the 
opposite one might argue. I will, however, venture to say that this 
particular strand of Islamism has clear indications of being instrumentally 
utilized in order to promote their political agenda. This rests on the fact 
that they on the one hand claim to be maintaining the pure version of the 
Islamic faith, untampered by exegesis; on the other they exercise great 
inventiveness in order to i.a. justify the application of the doctrine of jihad 
(refer section 5.3). Reversing the analogy of Marx who rendered religion 
as the opium of the Masses I will assert that the jihadi-Salafist have made 
religion the amphetamine of the masses. 
 
• Symbolization 
The process of symbolization is, as the psychological mechanisms are, 
triggered by socio-economic conditions and is included primarily to 
conceptualize the aversion towards the west as expressed by the jihadi-
Salafists. 
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2.2 Scope of the project - limitations 
The mechanisms included in the project are, as stated above, by no means a 
complete list of mechanisms. Obviously, as in all politics - secular or religious, 
general propagandistic instruments are heavily involved in the recruitment 
process. As Marty and Scott Appleby point out:  
 
“[Islamists are] manipulative champions of a vision of religious dogma 
which promises spectacular improvements in the lives of ordinary people 
[.....]” ([my italics]quoted in Haynes 1998: 129) 
 
Further, as i.a. Jon Elster (Elster: 2004) demonstrates, the field of social 
psychology will also be vital for insights into the motivations of jihadi-Salafists. 
Both social-categorization- and social-identity theories, group- and peer pressure 
are relevant for understanding the attraction of jihadi-Salafism. Aristotle points to 
the relevance of social psychology by stating:  
 
“in battle, most soldiers refrain from cowardly behavior because of the fear 
of being punished by their superiors, whereas others are held in check by 
the shame they would feel before their peers” (quoted in Elster 2004: 12).  
 
These factors have been thoroughly assessed previously, i.a in Sageman (2004), 
and it is recognized that they are decisive in the radicalization process. I will 
however argue that before a person is subject to e.g. group- and peer pressure 
he has been affected by psychological mechanisms (and the process of 
symbolization) triggered by the structural conditions in the society he lives. I.e. 
his previous experiences and the psychological effects of these will be decisive 
regarding how his social network will affect him.  
 
Including social-categorization- and identity- theories in the current thesis’ 
structuralist perspective, a tentative hypothesis will thus be:  
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Psychological mechanisms triggered by structural conditions predispose 
Muslims to the jihadi-Salafi ideology; their acceptance of the call for jihad 
is conditioned by their social network and relations.  
 
Sageman (2004) has convincingly shown the significance of i.a. social networks 
when people accept the jihadi-Salafists call for jihad.  
I do, however, believe that without the existence of certain structural conditions 
the validity of group- and peer pressure is void as the group would not hold the 
incentives in question. 
My reading of Sageman supports this notion: 
 
“[…] those who sympathize and may want to participate in the jihad. This 
much larger disconnected and unorganized network consists of small 
cliques and singletons who want to join the jihad but have not been able to 
do so. This pool of potential candidates may increase or decrease 
according to sociopolitical events in the world.” (Sageman 2004: 172)  
 
This project will thus suggest a possible framework for understanding why 
Muslims respond to this kind of group- and peer pressure. As Sageman 
acknowledges, the structural conditions in the Middle East are decisive in this 
respect. In what follows, I hope to be able to substantiate their significance in the 
forming of incentives making Muslims receptive to the Jihadi-Salafi ideology. 
 
With reference to the foregoing observations I assume that the thesis’ omission 
of individual level empirical data is justified.   
 
2.3 Outline of behavioral incentives 
 Including the additional mechanisms in the previously sketched figure, the 
broader picture will be as follows:  
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Figure 2.2 Schematic outline of behavioral incentives 
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This figure locates the topical mechanisms around the formative period. Further it 
suggests that the psychological mechanisms, as mentioned above, form the 
necessary condition in which the other mechanisms operate.  
 
3. Elaborating the mechanisms 
My hypothesis is that the psychological mechanisms listed on page 10 are 
essential when explaining the attraction of the jihadi-Salafi ideology. I will argue 
that these are a condition for the other two mechanisms to be fully operational. 
The process of symbolization will be viewed as both an autodynamic process 
triggered by socio-economic factors as well as a process utilized by the jihadi-
Salafists. The instrumental utilization of religion will explore if, how and, possibly, 
to what degree the jihadi-Salafists are utilizing and adapting the Islamic faith in 
order to further their political agenda. Building on the considerations on page 11, 
I recognize that the nature of religion and religious belief per se will make it 
difficult to draw conclusions in these matters. On the other hand I believe that 
including this mechanism will bring further insights into why Muslims accept the 
jihadi-Salafists call for jihad.  
 
In Johan Galtungs words one could say that the jihadi-Salafi ideologists stir up a 
“pot of soup”4 in order to attract followers. 
Jason Burke points in the same direction when characterizing the most influential 
contributor to the jihadi-Salafist branch of Islamic militancy, Abdullah Azzam:  
 
“Azzam’s writings are not political tracts, or even arguments, but exhortations to 
violence” (Burke 2003: 78). 
 
Developing the main approach the projects aim will be to answer the following 
questions: 
                                            
4 In a lecture given at UIO 14.02.03 the US foreign policy was parabled as a pot of soup in which 
aims, desires and excuses where stirred together.  
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• What role do psychological mechanisms play in making people receptive 
to the jihadi-Salafi ideology? 
 
As the preceding section indicates, I allege that the psychological mechanisms 
are a prerequisite in order to make the other two mechanisms i.e. the process of 
symbolization and the instrumental use of Islam operational. I will substantiate 
this notion by examining the socio-economic conditions in the Muslim world, 
limited to the Middle East. 
 
Harold D. Lasswells theory of symbolization will be offered as a contributing 
factor explaining the jihadi-Salafists force of attraction:  
 
• Is the process of symbolization a contributing factor in the process of 
making Muslims receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology? 
 
The theory put forth by Harold D. Lasswell in Psychopathology and Politics 
published in 1930 will serve two purposes. First, it will help conceptualize the 
aversion felt by the jihadi-Salafists towards the “West”, second, it might shed light 
on how this process utilized by jihadi-Salafi leaders such as Sayyid Qutb, 
Abdullah Azzam, Ayman Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. This is an elaboration 
of the Lasswellian idealtype of the process of symbolization which is an 
autodynamic mechanism triggered by socio-economic factors.  
 
Finally, the jihadi-Salafists’ possible instrumental use of religion is examined: 
 
• Is Islam utilized instrumentally by the jihadi-Salafists?  
 
I will assess this question by examining the radical interpretations and 
amendments of important jihadi-Salafi ideologues (refer section 4). 
  
  16
A closer examination of all the topical mechanisms is found in section 6.  
 
4. Islamism 
The following provides a background for understanding the emergence of jihadi-
Salafism and the thesis’ perspective of their instrumental use of religion.  
 
The emergence of modern Islamism (political Islam) is generally considered as 
coinciding with the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian Hassan 
al-Banna in 1928. Islamism and its revivalist movements however, have a long 
tradition within Islam starting off with the Shia faction. This group broke away 
from the traditional school in 661 after the assassination of the fourth caliph Ali, 
after a dispute over the succession to Muhammad, hence the literal translation of 
Shiite, Ali’s party. 
Jihadi-Salafism emerged as a political ideology during the Afghan war. It is an 
ideology steeped in a religious discourse and worldview, but as their aim is 
clearly political, the creation of a society governed according to the Islamic law, 
al-Sha’ria, I find it adequate to refer to it as a political ideology.  
This view is however not shared by the jihadi-Salafists, as they do not separate 
religion from politics: Islam is all encompassing, it regulates all aspects of human 
life and thus also politics. Man-made laws are un-Islamic, kufr, and thus 
forbidden.  
 
Before turning to jihadi-Salafism I will elaborate on the concept of Islamism 
based on Sami Zubaida (2000). He operates with the following ideal types of 
Islamism: 
 
Conservative Islamism 
This strand pursue ’regular’ conservative values as property, family and discipline   
through regular political channels. By means of governmental lobbying and 
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lawmaking they call for the application of the Islamic law, al-Sha’ria. Although 
found throughout the Muslim world, the Saudi establishment and its Wahhabi 
strand can serve to exemplify this type.  
 
Political Islamism 
The political Islamists work for social, political and religious reforms in societies 
that are based on Islam and can be exemplified by the Iranian revolutionaries 
such as Sharia’ti, Talanghani, and an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, 
al-Wasat (the center).  
 
“Al Wasat’s program was based on civil liberties, human rights, national 
unity and so on and thus departed from the ideology of the Brothers in 
subscribing, without ambiguity, to Western principles of democracy” (Kepel 
2004: 296)  
 
Even though still prohibited, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is generally (by 
2006) classified as political Islamists. Since the 1980s they have followed a non-
violence stance and representatives with ties to the brotherhood won a 
considerable amount of seats during the elections in 2005. 
  
Radical Islamism 
In general the radical Islamists are in line with the conservatives insofar as the 
implication of the Islamic law, al-Sha’ria. They do however differ by means of 
method; as they hold the political establishment to be un-Islamic and impious, 
they work for a transformation of society by means of militancy. These groups 
are in large measures inspired by the writings of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. 
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As Thomas Hegghammer points out regarding militant Islamists, figure 4.1 the 
different strands of Islamism can be thought of as corners in a triangle, the actual 
groups, movements etc. are located along the most applicable continuum.  
 
4.1 Militant Islamism 
Militant Islamism is a vast and disparate mixture of groups with varying motives, 
methods and ideologies. Following Hegghammer (forthcoming), three types of 
militant Islamism are recognized:  
 
Socio- revolutionary  
These groups are fuelled by socio-economic grievances and the national elites’ 
failed attempts to deal with these. The first socio-revolutionary groups emerged 
in Egypt in the 1970s. Inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb these groups’ 
violent actions, culminating with the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 
October 1981, became a serious threat to the political stability. Their jihad is 
fought to create an Islamic society governed according to the law of God, al-
Sha’ria.  
 
Nationalist-separatist  
The nationalist-separatist groups emerged in Palestine and Lebanon in the 
1980s. As opposed to the socio-revolutionary, these groups do not aim at 
complete transformation of society; their jihad is a resistance towards Israeli 
occupation of Palestine and Southern Lebanon. The founders of the first of these 
groups the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi-l-Falastin 
were inspired by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. In the late 1970 Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin’s Hamas, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, was established as 
a social institution. Their military operations did not commence before the 1987 
intifada.  
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During the 1980s the Shiite Hezbollah organization employed guerilla tactics and 
executed spectacular operations, i.a. suicide missions in their struggle against 
the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.  
In addition to their firm resistance toward Israel, their substantial social-measures 
have given both Hamas and Hezbollah substantial support among the 
Palestinian population in general. Consequently, Hamas won the majority of the 
votes in the January 2006, elections in the Palestinian territories.  
These groups have focused on domestic targets, and they have deliberately 
distanced themselves from al-Qaida and other “global-jihadists”. It is thus vital to 
acknowledge the fact that these groups are locally oriented.  
 
Global-jihadist 
Hegghammer (forthcoming) points to three main reasons for the emergence of 
global-jihadism in the 1990s:  
 
• The hegemonic position of the USA after the collapse of the USSR 
 
• The failure of local Islamist insurgencies 
 
• A product of the ideological and social uniformity set in motion by 
the training camps in Afghanistan 
 
Being the most radical of the three, they are aimed at defeating the USA and 
their allies in order to restore the Islamic Caliphate. 
Al-Qaida is arguably the primary global-jihadist group, it is a jihadi-Salafist group, 
but not all jihadi-Salafists are globally oriented. One can therefore assume that 
jihadi-Salafists are found within all three types of militant Islamist groups. The 
jihadi-Salafists are covered in more detail in section 4.3 ff.  
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These categories represent ideal-types and are best viewed as corners in a 
triangle. The different groups are positioned along the most applicable 
continuum: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
 
                                                                                     (Hegghammer forthcoming) 
 
Figure 4.1 Militant Islamism conceptualized  
 
4.2 Ancestors 
The following sections will cover some aspects of two ideologists working in 
highly different times, Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya in medieval Arabia, and Hassan 
al-Banna in turn-of-the-19th century Egypt.  
They are both vital for insights into the ideology of jihadi-Salafist groups such as 
al-Qaida.  
 
Global-jihadism
Socio-revolutionary Nationalist-separatist 
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Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, 1263-1328 
Taymiyya is considered the spiritual father of many of today’s Islamist militants, 
including the jihadi-Salafist Osama bin Laden. Being the primary source of 
guidance for the Wahhabi school of the late 18th century Arabia he is also given 
credit for the conservatism, literalism and fundamentalism evident both in the 
Wahhabi school and the militant Islamism of today.  
Taymiyya’s times were marked by internal dispute and division. The rivalry 
among local caliphates had brought the Islamic community, the Umma into a 
state of diffusion and anxiety. 
Muslim Arabia went through one of its hardest ordeals, including the onslaught of 
the horse riding forces of Genghis and Kublai Khan and 200 years of menacing 
by the Crusaders.   
Taymiyya claimed that the troubles of the Umma were due to their apostasy, i.e. 
they had not followed the injunctions of the holy Qur’an. The remedy he 
prescribed was to bypass the adaptation of the sacred texts years of exegesis 
had brought and return to the genuine virtues of Islam.  
This is the essence of the jihadi-Salafi ideology of today: as the Muslim regimes 
have strayed away from the true path of Islam they are attacked and humiliated 
by infidels.  
The remedy is the still the same: establish a society modeled on the first Islamic 
community as established by the Prophet. 
  
Hassan al-Banna, 1906-1949 
The Egyptian Al-Banna’s times were marked by similar upheavals as those of 
Taymiyya. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1922 and 
set up a secular Turkish nation-state. This was a huge blow for the literalist 
branch of the Muslim population. In 1922 Britain withdrew from Egypt, but by 
reserving the right to intervene in any matter affecting the British Empire, it left 
the post-colonial elites with limited autonomy. In 1928, fuelled by socio-economic 
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recession and demographic upheavals, Al-Banna, formerly educated as a school 
teacher, founded Al-Ikwan Al-Moslemoon i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood. It 
developed into a religio-political mass movement, which is still active, in Egypt 
and other countries in the Islamic world.  
 
The social-reformist al-Banna became the Ikwan’s first leader and murshid 
(spiritual guide). 
As Taymiyya several hundred years earlier, the ideology of the Brotherhood 
composed of a return to the true Islamic values. The nationalist sentiments, 
including European-style legislation and system of government, would only make 
things worse for the disconcerted umma.  
 
” [....] – the Brothers responded with a slogan that is still current in the 
Islamist movement: “The Koran is our constitution.” Islam, for the Brothers, 
was a complete and total system, and there was no need to go looking for 
European values as a basis for social order. Everything was made clear in 
the Koran, whose moral principles, the Brothers claimed, were universal” 
(Kepel 2004:27). 
 
4.3 Modern times   
Aware of the problems following a broad generalization across the Muslim 
population, following Kepel (2004) it seems adequate to describe the Islamist 
revival beginning in the 1960s as a religious response to the prevailing nationalist 
sentiments.  
Like their ancestors, the ideologists of the 1950s and 60s saw the nationalist 
government strategy as a dead-end and the solution were similar to their 
forefathers: implementation of the injunctions set forth in the Qur’an. Much of this 
antipathy stems from demographic upheavals and the unsuccessful efforts of the 
regimes in power to meet these challenges. As a consequence of their opposition 
towards the regimes, a great number of the Islamists were persecuted, jailed 
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without sentence and tortured. In all likelihood, this was a significant contribution 
in the radicalization of these individuals; many of these are today high-ranking 
members of al-Qaida and other militant groups.  
The following section will deal with one of the most influential thinkers within 
modern Islamist militancy, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb.  
 
Sayyid Qutb 
The following provides a background for the thesis’ perspective of the jihadi-
Salafists’ instrumental use of Islam. I will focus on Qutb’s reworking of the 
concept and justification of the doctrine of jihad.  
Central in his adaptation is the reworking of the term jahiliyya. In its original 
meaning jahiliyya referred to the impious era before Muhammad’s revelation of 
Islam, in which the Arabs had lived for centuries in a state of ignorance. Qutb’s 
reworking was, seen through the lens of a modern political campaigner, a 
masterstroke. By denoting the post-colonial era as jahiliyya, he managed to 
consign the nationalist elites ”metaphorically to the pre-Revelation abyss”(Kepel 
2004: 25).  
To stigmatize the elites even further he made use of the concepts created earlier 
by the Indian Sayyid Abdul Al’a (Maulana) Mawdudi: sovereignty (hakimiyya) and 
adoration (ouboudiyya). By applying these concepts he cleared the way for the 
dichotomization between the west and the true Islamic values as put forth in the 
Qur’an. The logic of this is quite straight forward and do not differ in any 
significant way from the early ideologists. It cements the idea of the Qur’an as the 
only source for guidance and the rhetorical force of this move is unprecedented; 
no less in the hands of the eloquent and charismatic public speaker Sayyid Qutb. 
 
”When sovereignty is vested in an ”idol,” whether a nation, party, army, or 
people, and when this idol becomes the subject of mass adoration, [...] 
then evil, inequity, an falsehood reign. The result is anti-Islam, jahiliyya” 
(Kepel 2004: 26). 
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The conclusion will thus be: Allah is the only legitimate sovereign and the only 
one worthy of adoration. Contrary to the gradualist Mawdudi, Qutb spoke out for 
a clean break with the established order.  
The consequences of Qutb defining his own times as jahiliyya were however not 
limited to this.  
According to Islamic law and doctrine it implied that the nationalist regimes and 
their inhabitants no longer could be regarded as Muslims, they were kufr 
(impious). Consequently the Islamic doctrine of takfir i.e. excommunication would 
be applicable. It is a common but much disputed concept within Islamic doctrine. 
Qutb’s application extinguishes itself as quite extreme: 
  
• Pronouncing someone as takfir is principally reserved for the ulema, 
it is a last resort used reluctantly.  
 
• Qutb were not an alim and his judgment was universal, the only ones 
who escaped his kufr judgment was those following his command. 
 
The consequences for a person defined as kufr, are harsh:  
 
[...] ”one who is, or claims to be, a Muslim is declared to be impure: by 
takfir he is excommunicated in the eyes of the Community of the Faithful. 
[....] one who is impious to this extent can no longer benefit from the 
protection of law. According to the consecrated expression, ”his blood is 
forfeit”, and he is condemned to death” (Kepel 2004: 31). 
 
In the final step of his radical interpretation Qutb rendered the kufr nationalists 
and everyone not intensely opposing them, legitimate targets of Jihad. In 
Milestones, by many considered to be a primary source of modern radical 
Islamism he puts forth the notion of a vanguard whose duty is to carry out the 
injunctions following this application.  
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”[...] a ”vanguard” of ”true Muslims” has to build itself up mentally and 
physically (militarily), to be able to launch an all out war on the kuffar. 
Because Muslims are in a state of weakness, the build up requires the 
”vanguard” to excommunicate the infidel society, emigrate and establish a 
true Islamic community based on the undistorted principles of Islam” 
(Nesser 2004: 22).  
 
Qutb’s reworking and justification of the jihadi doctrine is one of the most 
important elements of today’s jihadi-Salafism and I will return to this in chapter 7.  
 
4.4 Radical Islamist ideology 
The following is a summary of significant social factors I believe to be vital in the 
understanding of the emergence and attraction of jihadi-Salafism.  
 
”The radical Islamist movement itself, whose very existence had been 
unknown to all but a very few, was now associated with a revolution 
whose contours were vague but whose essential nature appeared to be as 
radical as it was virulently anti-Western” (Kepel 2004: 61). 
 
Following the execution of Qutb in 1966, a slide of events significantly affected 
both the capability and the maneuvering space of the radical Islamists.  
The historically severest blow to the Islamists was Atatürk’s abolishment of the 
Caliphate March 3. 1924. The founding of the Muslim Brotherhood followed only 
a few years after this (1928). By the end of the 1960s the socio-economic and 
religio-political situation had deteriorated in such a way as to convert al-Banna’s 
Islamic social-reformism into a radical extremist ideology.  
The most significant singular event boosting radical Islamism was the Arab 
nationalists’ defeat by Israel in 1967. This is considered a turning point.  
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The inability of the ruling nationalist elites to meet the needs of the general 
population and the strategy of banning the Islamists from the political scene 
backfired on the ruling elites. Repressing the Islamists only made their grassroots 
support stronger and their support was seen as recent as the 2005 Egyptian 
elections, in which representatives linked to the prohibited Brotherhood gained 
considerable support.  
Radical Islamism is a vast and disparate conglomerate of ideologies, 
movements, groups, ideas and objectives. This project deals with one of the 
most extreme factions, jihadi-Salafism. Building on the ideas of Qutb and his 
predecessors, Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s lodestar, is regarded as the 
instigator of this extreme variant of Islamism.  
 
Abdullah Azzam – modern Islamist militancy  
In order to further substantiate the notion of the jihadi-Salafists’ instrumental 
utilization of Islam I will assess the work of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian 
university professor. He is among the most influential sources of modern Islamist 
militancy, including jihadi-Salafi ideology and Osama bin Laden.  
Bin Laden studied at the Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi-Arabia, when 
Azzam and Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Mohammed, were lecturing there. Later, bin 
Laden and Azzam teamed up in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Afghan 
war. Azzam and bin Laden is said to have supplemented each other as bin 
Laden’s energy, organizational and networking skills were given Islamic 
credentials through Azzams profound Islamic knowledge, charisma and 
confidence. Bin Laden’s entry into Jihadi-Salafism was as financer of the Afghan-
Arabs during the Afghan war. He funded training camps, bunkers and safe-
houses as well as being a reportedly fearless fighter. Later on, he and his now 
second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri, becomes central in the development of 
the global jihadi-doctrine. 
In his work, building on the ideas of Taymiyya, Mawdudi, al-Banna and Qutb, he 
mixes the historical with the contemporary. This is most evident in his utilization 
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of Qutb’s reworked concept of jihad and the notion of the Muslim vanguard. The 
latter is ascribed to sure 2:249 which refer to the tale of David defeating Goliath:  
 
”Many a small army defeated a large army by Gods leave”.5 
 
This quotation is moreover frequently used by bin Laden. (Burke 2003:36)  
As Qutb, Azzam believed that a small band of pious Muslims (members of their 
inner circles) would be necessary to guide the mislead Muslims back on the true 
path. Azzams call, as opposed to Qutb’s, profited from being set forth in a much 
more favorable context, i.e. during the Afghan war. While Qutb’s call failed to 
affect any significant number of individuals, except those of his inner circle, 
Azzam took the role as instigator of the substantial number of Afghan Arab 
volunteers. By the pen of Azzam, the Afghan veterans were eventually 
transformed into a mobile international jihadi strike force. This being his intention, 
it is disputed how well he succeeded. In his writings there are innumerable 
references to al-Qaida as the vanguard, and the force of groups like al-Qaida 
can, however, not be neglected6.  
 
”The international brigade of jihad veterans, being outside the control of 
any state, was suddenly available to serve radical Islamist causes 
anywhere in the world [....] It bred a new hybrid Islamist ideology whose 
first doctrinal principle was to rationalize the existence and behavior of 
militants” (Kepel 2004: 219). 
 
                                            
5 www.submission.org/suras/sura2.htm 
6 The origin of the name al-Qaida and its literal meaning is not verified. There is evidence pointing 
in direction of it being a database file containing the names and contact information of Afghan 
Arab veterans for the sake of social benefits as bin Laden managed extensive relief efforts for the 
Arabs joining the Jihad in Afghanistan, hence the literal translation of al-Qaida: “the base”. In this 
perspective al-Qaida as the name of bin Laden’s terrorist group was “created” by American 
intelligence advisers to facilitate the prosecution of “these” individuals, i.e. if it could be proven 
that the alleged terrorists were members of an international terrorist organization they could i.a. 
be prosecuted according to existing organized crime laws. Azzam’s own reference to al-Qaida 
seems however to contradict this theory, however in view of “al-Qaida’s” most attentive attitude 
towards the media and “marketing strategies” it is possible that they began using the name “al-
Qaida” after the American government had rendered them persona non grata.  
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Even though the conglomerate of individuals ascribing to the global-jihadi 
doctrine by far can be described as a homogenous group, this quote touches the 
core of what is known as jihadi-Salafism. Jihadi-Salafism is a collective term of 
the various militant groups advocating the use of jihad as a means to rearrange 
society as a mirror image of the Golden Era of the Prophet and his Companions.  
 
The effectiveness of his reworked vanguard was further reinforced by his 
development of the concept of jihad, which is the single most important factor in 
Azzams doctrine. In his best-known booklet, Defending the Land of the Muslims 
Is Each Man’s Most Important Duty, he, as the title clearly indicates, elevates 
jihad to become the greatest virtue of Islam. This signifies a clean break with 
traditional application, including the reformist Salafists’. 
According to the reformists “several prior phases are necessary before a jihad is 
permissible” (Wiktorowiczq). 
The first step is tarbiya, education and implies that prior to waging jihad the 
community should prepare itself by acquiring the proper Muslim practice to be 
spiritually prepared for the Jihad. The second step, tasfiya, purification coincide 
with what the Qur’an render the “Greater jihad”: a personal inner struggle to 
become a better person, improve oneself and ones’ society [my translation] 
(Rashid 2002: 138). It is thus imperative that prior to waging war, i.e jihad, the 
community of the Faithful is educated in the proper Salafi doctrine. One of the 
main incentives of these prior phases and for Islam per se is for the community to 
avoid fitna, i.e. dissension among the community of the Faithful, the Umma. 
Without this unity in faith prior to waging Jihad, Allah will not reward the Umma 
with victory.  
As the reformist Salafists argue this rash into jihad clearly differs from the 
Prophet’s application. Muhammad spent the first half of his mission calling 
people to Islam and teaching people the proper understanding of the Islamic 
faith, before fighting jihad. Contrary to the jihadi-Salafists, they regard the Afghan 
jihad a failure, due to the factional classes and disarray following the Soviets‘ 
withdrawal.  
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Opposing the thesis’ perspective of the jihadi-Salafists instrumental use of Islam 
is the inherent traits of religion per se. I recognize the fact that the jihadi-Salafists’ 
call for jihad can be justified with reference to both the doctrine of fard ‘ayn and 
fard kifaya, the latter referring to the collective obligation of the Muslims for 
offensive attacks in enemy territories, the former to the individual obligation of 
fighting a defensive jihad to defend the Muslim territories when threatened by 
infidel forces. Whether or not the defensive or offensive jihad doctrine, or both, is 
applicable in the current situation, is subject to opinion. However, by rejecting the 
ulema’s reserved right to issue fatwas legitimizing jihad and defying Islam’s 
explicit rejection of rebellion against Muslim leaders he signifies a clean break  
with fundamental Islamic doctrines.  
 
Jihad was not only an individual’s obligation, but everyone capable of fighting 
jihad could do so without any authorization. 
  
I thus find it adequate to assert that the jihadi-Salafists image of their ideology as 
the only legitimate, claiming to be following the model of the Prophet it is void of 
validity.  
Section 6.3 and 7.3 on instrumental religion will discuss these matters further by 
assessing the apparent logical flaws in the jihadi-Salafi ideology further.  
 
5. Reshaping the Islamist ideology 
I will begin with the key events that set the stage for the growth of militant 
Islamism:  
 
• 1967 - Israel defeats the Arabic armies in the Six Day War 
After this, Nasser offered to resign. In many ways this was the beginning, 
or the end, dependent on which camp you were in: the end if you were an 
Arab nationalist and the beginning if a radical Islamist. ”[....] the 1967 
defeat seriously undermined the ideological edifice of nationalism and 
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created a vacuum to be filled a few years later by Qutb’s Islamist 
philosophy [...]” (Kepel 2004: 63). 
 
• 1970s petro Islam (Kepel 2004: 61) 
During the 1970s Saudi-Arabia’s position as the leading oil-producing 
country in the world boosted its capacity to spread its Wahhabi style Sunni 
Islam.  
The 70s were also marked by a sudden emergence of militant Islamist 
movements throughout the Muslim world. Many of these were supported 
by the Saudi regime itself or Saudi based organizations i.a. the Muslim 
World League.  
 
• 1973 the October War - Arab – Israeli war  
The preceding summer the Gamaat Islamiya was established on Egyptian 
campuses. The oil embargo following the war was a show of international 
force and resistance by the Saudi monarchy. In addition it boosted the 
cogency of their efforts to wahhabize Islam worldwide.  
 
• 1979 USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan 
Later to become the most renowned breading ground and host country of 
terrorist training camps. This is arguably the single most important factor 
in the history of militant Islamism as it provided an environment were 
individuals with similar incentives and worldview were given the 
opportunity to exchange ideas and further develop their ideology. The 
actual combat experience they gained during the Afghan jihad has turned 
many of these individuals into highly-skilled militants, both as executives, 
instructors and architects of militant actions. Even though the withdrawal 
of the Soviet troops was due mostly to the native Afghan Mujahedeen, the 
Afghan Arabs came out with a boosted self-confidence. Their reputation 
and credibility throughout the Muslim world were exceedingly 
strengthened. 
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• 1987 Palestinian intifada  
The Palestinian resistance groups have very different incentives than the 
jihadi-Salafists. They are locally oriented and are generally categorized as 
nationalist-separatists and strive to distance themselves from the globally 
oriented jihadi-Salafists. The Salafists denote the fate of the Palestinian 
people as one of their main incentives.  
 
• Gulf war 1990-91 
Turning down the proposal set forth by Osama bin Laden and the Afghan 
veterans and letting non-Muslim troops onto the Arabian Peninsula 
marked the beginning of the decline of the Saudi monarchy in the eyes of 
the jihadi-Salafists. The severe resistance to non-Muslims on the 
Peninsula is ascribed to the words Muhammad supposedly said while 
dying: ”Two religions shall not remain together on the peninsula of the 
Arabs”. Even though other passages seem to refute this, i.a. by describing 
the rights and duties of non-Muslims living within Muslim territory, the 
jihadi-Salafists are championing this vigorously. 
 
These events have been decisive in the propagation of the jihadi-Salafi ideology, 
and I find it adequate to separate them into two categories:  
 
Enablers  
• Petro Islam  
• USSR’s  invasion of Afghanistan 
 
Instigators 
• Six day- and  October war 
• The Palestinian intifada  
• The Gulf war 
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The enablers supplied the jihadi-Salafists with the financial and strategic 
resources they needed in order to develop and spread their ideology as well as a 
safe haven for their training camps.  
Today the Saudi monarchy is a declared opponent of the jihadi-Salafists and a 
close ally of the USA in the war on terror. Substantial funds have however flowed 
from the Saudi oil fields in support of not only what today is known as jihadi-
Salafism, but to a myriad of Islamist groups throughout the world.  
Osama bin Laden started his career as a generous benefactor of the 
mujahedeen and Afghan Arabs during the Afghan war. The cash flow continues 
today, with or without bin Laden’s funds and without the consent of the Saudi 
monarch.  
After the September 11th attack on the USA, considerable efforts have been 
made to stop the funding of militant groups. Even though some progress has 
been made and key financers have been identified this is a Sisyphean task:  
 
“The committee [UN committee monitoring al-Qaida] noted that private 
donations to the group [al-Qaida] were continuing ‘largely unabated’. The 
FBI designated nine men as key terrorist financers: seven Saudis, a 
Pakistani and an Egyptian. But to pick out individuals is ludicrous. The 
basis for the funding of modern Islamic terrorism, whether committed by 
individuals linked to bin Laden or any other group or acting on their own, is 
the sympathy felt among millions of Muslims worldwide. Stopping the 
activities of nine men will do nothing to stop the problem. [….] Since 
September 11th, donations to radical movements, all over the Islamic 
world, have substantially increased” (Burke 2003: 235-236). 
 
The instigators represent the utmost humiliation of the Islamic world as a whole 
and the jihadi-Salafists per se. Refusing the assistance of bin Laden’s Afghan 
veterans and letting infidel forces onto the Arabian Peninsula, represented a 
crossroads in the relationship between the Saudi establishment and the jihadi-
Salafists. The jihadi-Salafists regarded this as a violation of the injunctions set 
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forth in the Qur’an and in their eyes it proved the Saudi hypocrisy. Cutting a long 
story short, these events cemented the jihadi-Salafists’ notion of themselves as 
the only legitimate Islamic entity. Drawing on sections 7.2 and 7.3 it appears 
evident that these events have been vital in the development of the symbolic 
force of the jihadi-Salafist ideology.  
From the Salafists’ point of view the instigators confirm the notion that straying 
away from the path of Allah is severely punished; the cure is however straight 
forward: resurrect the Caliphate and establish a society governed according to 
the Sha’ria.  
 
5.1 Socio-economic conditions 
In line with i.a. Kepel, Burke and Hegghammer I view the jihadi-Salafist ideology 
as a movement for social change. Their declared aim is to restructure the society 
along the lines of Muhammad’s early Umma. This is a society in which the law of 
God, al-Sha’ria, is the only source of legislation. Finally they will resurrect the 
Caliphate.  
  
“By promising to re-establish social justice on the model of the first state of 
Islam set up by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, the Islamists held out 
a vision of utopia. They also gave expression to the populace’s visceral 
hostility towards regimes gnawed by corruption, bankruptcy (both 
economic and moral), and authoritarianism – […]” (Kepel 2004: 6). 
 
By 2005 we see that Iraq is a vital part of this struggle, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
commonly referred to as al-Qaida’s second in command, writes in a letter to Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, the assumed leader of the Iraqi resistance:  
 
”[….] it is my humble opinion that the Jihad in Iraq requires several 
incremental goals: [….] Establish an Islamic authority or amirate [emirate], 
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then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over 
as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq” (Zawahiri).   
 
The psychological mechanisms and the process of symbolization addressed in 
the current project are induced by certain structural conditions. I will pursue the 
hypothesis presented in section 2, by examining general statistical data on the 
Middle East.  
Anticipating the findings I will point to what is known as the Tocqueville effect: 
when conditions in a society improve, the desires and aspirations of its citizens 
also grow. In a society deficient of civil and political liberties and a low living 
standard, an improvement of any of these factors will increase the citizens’ 
aspirations beyond the actual improvements. Thus, as the means to satisfy these 
expectations are absent, the result is frustration and resentment.                                                      
Jason Burke points in direction of the Tocqueville effect when he asserts that it 
is: 
 
“not [as the following statistical data substantiate] absolute deprivation that is the 
key, but the deprivation that follows a period of aspiration-raising relative 
prosperity” (Burke 2003: 245). 
 
The following will further cement the notion of the Middle East as a viable area 
for the sustained growth of militant Islamism.  
  
5.2 A fall from grace 
The society created by Muhammad before his death in 632 expanded over the 
following centuries to become one of the largest and most influential empires the 
world has seen. Since its decline, arguably beginning with Napoleons invasion of 
Egypt in 1806 and culminating in 1926 with the dissolving of the Ottoman Empire 
and Atatürk’s abolishment of the Caliphate, the Muslim heartland has been 
lagging behind. Once the political and cultural beacon of the world, state of 
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affairs today are marked by serious lack of political and civil liberties and extreme 
differences in living standard. As asserted in section 4.3 ff. the radical Islamists 
ascribe this decline to the deviation from the injunctions set forth in the Qur’an. 
With reference to sections 6.1 and 7.1 I will assert that this development justifies 
the application of the mechanism resentment caused by reversal of status 
hierarchies. 
 
5.3 Selected statistical data 
The current section, based on the Human Development Report 2005, the Arab 
Human Development Report 2004 commissioned by the United Nations 
Development Programme and Freedom House’s annual survey of Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties, Freedom in the World 2005, will substantiate the notion of the 
catalyzing effect of the prevailing structural conditions in the Middle East.  
 
The Tocqueville effect is identified as a key element as the socio-economic 
conditions, the lack of human rights, civil- and political freedoms are reinforcing 
the frustration and resentment caused by unsatisfied aspirations. The statistical 
data show that the Arab states are facing serious challenges in all of these areas 
and the reading of the reports can not be described as anything less than dismal. 
Between 2000 and 2003 there was a marginal increase in the HDI index from 
0,653 to 0,679. A thorough statistical analysis would reveal whether or not this 
increase is significant in any way and also what it is owed to. It might e.g. be due 
to an increased GDP as the general picture for the Arab states show that their 
HDI rank is relatively much lower than their GDP. Thus it might not represent 
anything else than increased oil revenues.  
Cementing the notion of the ill governed Arab States are the fact that 32 million 
people, i.e. 12 percent of the population in 15 Arab states suffer from 
malnutrition; a number which increased by 6 million during the 1990s, most of 
whom were in Somalia and Iraq. In the Palestinian territories 58.1 percent of the 
population subsists below the poverty line (AHDR 2004), in Pakistan 65.6 
percent has less than 2$ a day to live by, and 32.6 percent subsists below the 
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national poverty line. The numbers for Egypt is not much more encouraging: 43.9 
percent subsists on less than 2$ a day and 16.7 percent of the population is 
below the national poverty line.  
The educational system does neither provide any optimistic prospects for the 
future: 1/3rd. of the male- and ½ of the female Arab population are illiterate. In 
addition the education is generally of low quality failing to provide general 
capabilities or invest their pupils with the capacity of independent thinking. As the 
percentage of the population under age 15 is as high as 36.3, almost 5 percent 
higher than the total for the developing countries and close to 12 percent higher 
than that for the OECD countries, these challenges will only increase in the years 
to come.  
Moving on to civil and political liberties the picture is even more discouraging:  
According to Freedom House’s annual survey, by 2005, Turkey is the only 
country in the Middle East and North Africa rated free. The Arab states are thus 
topping the list of countries whose citizens enjoy the least freedom. The lack of 
freedom includes all aspects of society: restrictions on civil society organizations, 
the media and not to mention the absence of a fair political debate and elections.  
Popular participation is decreasing in the Arab States as such; human rights 
violations are continuously violated and have to some extent increased due to 
legislative acts inflicted by the so-called “War on Terror”.  
The Arab countries are further described as “Black-hole” states, (AHDR 2004) 
signifying that the elites and the existing bureaucratic apparatus are designed to 
preserve the prevailing societal structure: an extremely ill-balanced power 
structure where all power is vested in the executive body. The parliament, where 
it exists, does not represent the people but is rather another adjunct of the ruler.  
On top of this the executive controls the intelligence apparatus designed to 
preserve Status Quo.  
 
“Yet careful scrutiny of developments in this period indicates that, overall, 
there has been no significant easing of the human development crisis in 
the Arab region. Certainly, incipient reforms are taking place in more than 
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one of the priority areas identified in this Report, but for the most part 
those reforms have been embryonic and fragmentary.” (HDR 2005)  
 
6. Theoretical perspective 
The project’s perspective is that aggregate social phenomena are a 
consequence of individual human action. This notion, known as methodological 
individualism, will be employed in order to examine the apparent attraction to the 
jihadi-Salafist ideology. Three perspectives will be applied: psychological effects 
of structural conditions, the process of symbolization and the instrumental use of 
religion. These mechanisms differ in proportion to how they influence individuals, 
but my hypothesis is that their end-results are the same: a rally to the jihadi-
Salafi ideology and an aversion towards ”the West”.  
 
Section 2. ff. identifies psychological mechanism as a prerequisite for the other 
two mechanisms to be effective.  
 
6.1 Psychological mechanisms  
The psychological mechanisms addressed in the following analysis are divided 
into two main categories: hot- and cold processes (Elster 1993).  
 
A hot mechanism is characterized by a subconscious process in which the end-
result is an altered belief or desire. In Freud’s words one could say that the 
person is controlled by his superego that e.g. changes a person’s desire in such 
a way that they fit his opportunities. Put differently the alteration of the belief or 
desire serve a subconscious purpose. The outline below recognizes these 
purposes for each mechanism.  
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A cold mechanism is not as expedient as a hot-mechanism. It is marked by 
erroneous cognitive processing and the alteration does not serve a subconscious 
purpose. It can be likened to calculate 1 + 1 = 3.  
 
Adaptive preference formation 
In psychological terms, this is described as reduction of cognitive dissonance or 
from La Fontaine’s fable the sour grapes syndrome7. It is a subconscious causal 
process in which ones desires are adjusted to the perceived possibilities. It is 
provoked by a drive to reduce the frustration caused by having desires that can 
not be satisfied, i.e. cognitive dissonance. A person whose state of mind is 
marked by cognitive dissonance will subconsciously try to diminish this by 
changing his desires. Thus, it is a hot-process, in which the end-result is an 
altered desire.  
 
The story of the 17-year-old Pakistani in section 2 describes a possible effect of 
this process: as the Pakistani adolescent never will be able to attain the standard 
of living and cultural traits of the ‘westernized’ world he might very well end up 
opposing these values and resort to the diametrically opposing teachings of 
jihadi-Salafism. In the following analysis I will substantiate that this mechanism, 
coupled with the process of symbolization is decisive in i.a. the process which 
render the “west” “the great Satan”. 
 
Wishful thinking 
People engaged in wishful thinking adjust their beliefs about the world in 
accordance with their wants. Like the adaptive preference process this is a hot-
process. They do, however, differ in regard of the end-result, which is a belief in 
the case of wishful thinking as opposed to a desire. If the fact that you are about 
to carry out a suicide-attack convinces you that martyrdom will bring you eternal 
                                            
7 In one of his fables, La Fontaine describes a fox which is not able to reach the grapes. To 
escape the frustration it decides the grapes are sour.  
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life, it will be a case of wishful thinking. Bluntly, one could argue that religious 
belief per se is in fact a result of this process.                                                                                     
In the same way as people suffering under seemingly unbearable travails always 
seem to find a cause for their misery it is likely that the violent behavior of the 
Islamic militants can be retraced to wishful thinking: the militant behavior of the 
jihadi-Salafists is justified as the will of Allah. 
 
Resentment caused by reversal of status hierarchies 
Resentment is an emotion caused by a belief of injustice which induces a desire 
to reverse the status hierarchies. In a situation where a social group or 
population experience to be surpassed by another, the effect is resentment 
towards the new presiding social class. It is a hot-process: a certain belief about 
the world creates a desire to change the perceived conditions.  
 
According to Petersen 2002 the feeling of resentment spurs different attitudes 
contingent on the political context it originates in; stable societies, in which 
political institutions are intact and well functioning, the occurrence of violence is 
unlikely as the institutions provides an outlet for the sense of subordination. In 
less functioning societies where these channels are not intact or there is a 
discrepancy between two groups in a society the outcome is more probable to be 
violent: 
 
“Status reversal creates the highest intensity of resentment and produces 
the highest likelihood of violent conflict. Status reversal results when a 
more regionally powerful group in an established hierarchy is dislodged 
from its position and placed below a less powerful group” (Petersen 2002: 
52). 
 
Many eloquent works describe the decline of the Orient; among these are Lewis 
2002 and Said 2003. A comparative perspective on the Middle-Eastern, Muslim-
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Arab situation today, and the caliphates previous position as arguably the world’s 
culturally and militarily superior power gives substantial evidence of the 
significance of this mechanism. Further, I will maintain that the creation of the 
state of Israel in 1948 has been decisive in this regard.  
 
Inferential errors 
These are “[…] defects in the cognitive apparatus” (Elster 1996: 26) which would 
be an academic twist to what is commonly known as lack of good judgment.  As 
opposed to the earlier hot-processes this is a cold-process in which the result is 
an irrational belief. This mechanism is exemplified by the notion held by certain 
actors of the omnipotence of Israel and the cause of all evils. The people 
expressing these views argue on the other hand that this omnipotent power can 
be defeated (Elster 2004). 
 
These psychological mechanisms distort a person’s beliefs and desires and it is 
implied that they would be unacceptable to the subject if he were aware of them; 
on the other hand they might very well lend themselves to cultivation.  
 
6.2 Symbolization   
In the event of disturbing changes in a society and when populations experience 
traumatic incidents, two central effects are observed: 
 
• Affects are released from their previous objects 
 
• People become more receptive to proposals 
 
In these situations several competing symbols emerge which all compete    
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”to serve as a foci of concentration for the aroused community” (Lasswell 
1960:189). 
 
The outcome of this process is the survival of a few master symbols with 
dichotomization as the final result:  
 
”symbolization thus necessitates dichotomization” (Ibid:189). 
 
Lasswell continues by rendering symbolization as a powerful factor in social 
development and for the purpose of propaganda.  
My reading of the Lasswellian idealtype of the process of symbolization renders it 
autodynamic: the symbolization effect is triggered by structural conditions. In the 
forthcoming discussion it will however be asserted that this process is further 
utilized by the jihadi-Salafi ideologists.  
 
With reference to section 4 ff. covering the ideological traits of Islamism in 
general and jihadi-Salafism per se, it is recognized that the competing symbols 
are: 
 
•  Islam 
The jihadi-Salafists maintain an image of the immutable Islam. The Qur’an 
and its commandments are the only source of legislation and code of 
conduct.  
  
• the West 
The image of the decadent western society, its system of government and 
legislation represents the ultimate abuse of the Qur’anic commandments. 
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6.3 Instrumental Religion 
Recognizing the fact that the vast majority of the Muslim population do not 
indulge in jihadi-Salafism, the perspective of this section will be that of a 
convenient exegesis and instrumental utilization of Islam. I will maintain this 
notion by rendering the radicalized edition of Islam as principally a means for 
societal change in line with communism, socialism and capitalism. Qutb found all 
of these inadequate. 
Compared to other religions Islam is all encompassing as it regulates all aspects 
of society; thus it is also a potent instrument for social change. Qutb’s application 
does however signify a clear break with traditional Muslim attitude towards 
politics which is characterized by resignation and patience. The focus has 
traditionally been on avoiding fitna i.e. disorder and dissension among the 
community of the faithful. As a consequence, the doctrine of Takfir, central in 
Qutb’s radicalized edition of Islam, has been used reluctantly as he who 
confessed to be Muslim, was a Muslim. Their piety was only to be judged by 
God.  
 
“The notion of professed Muslims lapsing into Jahiliyya and becoming 
legitimate targets of jihad represents a bold reworking of Islamic political 
thought” (Brown 2000: 158). 
 
Qutb’s reworking of the term Jahiliyya cleared the way for an Islamic justification 
of the militant resistance towards the nationalist elites in 1960s Egypt. As the 
Qur’an explicitly forbids rebellion against any Muslim ruler, this consequently 
appears to be void of Islamic legitimacy. Contradicting this notion is the fact that 
all aspects of faith is subject to exegesis: in order to bypass this doctrine the 
jihadi-Salafists render the Muslim regimes they oppose as un-Islamic.  
I will return to these questions in subsequent sections, for now I will confine to 
assert that this is another logical defect of the jihadi-Salafi ideology.  
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Times defined as 
Jahiliyya 
People defined as  
Kufr 
Validates the doctrine of 
Takfir 
Individuals are  
Excommunicated 
Legitimate targets of  
JIHAD 
In recent years the jihadi-Salafists has readily applied this logic. In addition to 
being a bold reworking of the justification of Jihad, it arguably redefines the very 
notion of Jihad:  
 
“primarily [jihad] is a personal inner struggle to become a better person, 
improve oneself and help her or his society [my translation]”(Rashid 2002: 
138).  
 
Referring to section 4.3 ff. this coincides with the several phases which are 
necessary before a jihad is permissible.  Thus, it seems adequate to maintain the 
notion of the convenient exegesis of the jihadi-Salafists.  
The following figure will serve to illustrate the ideological logic behind the 
radicalized concept of jihad: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Ideological logic of jihad 
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This illustrates the legacy of Qutb: a radical interpretation of central Islamic 
concepts. It represents a clean brake and a radical revision of the traditional  
Islamic application summarized in the following table:  
 
Table 6.1 Traditional vs. radical application 
 
 
 
 
Traditional 
 
Radicalized 
 
Jahiliyya 
Impious,  barbaric historical period 
before the Islamic revelation 
Qutb’s own times – also today 
 
Kufr 
An impious, non- Muslim. 
Judgment made by God. 
 
All not following Qutb’s command 
 
Takfir 
A doctrine pronounced by alims 
Reluctantly used 
 
Pronounced by Qutb – not an alim 
Applied universally 
Rebellion 
against 
Muslim rulers 
Prohibited Permitted 
 
 
The jihadi-Salafists extensive use of suicide bombers, the justification of these 
actions and the rendering of these as martyrs represents yet another bold 
reworking of the Islamic tradition. It differs from conventional Islamic practice on 
two crucial points: 
 
1. Suicide is regarded a sin and thus prohibited, he who commits 
suicide will not be salvaged. 
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2. A Martyr is by definition one who sacrifices his life defending the 
name of Allah, i.e. killed by infidels. 
 
When the jihadi-Salafists sanction the use of suicide attacks as the will of Allah, 
this is due to another convenient exegesis: as it is an attack aimed at killing 
infidels and thus defending the Muslim heartland they “disregard” the fact that the 
martyrs cause their own deaths. It might be due to tactical considerations and 
pragmatism. The jihadi-Salafists limited resources and manpower restrict the 
damage they can cause by means of conventional tactics. Further, it can be 
argued that due to the enemy’s superiority, all attacks are possible suicidal. 
Instead of facing the inevitable death by enemy fire, the effect of their attack is 
increased by blowing themselves up.  
 
I find it adequate to offer the following conclusions: 
  
1. As the suicide attackers by definition commit suicide they violate the 
Qur’anic commands.  
 
2. Thus, when jihadi-Salafists promise martyrdom to their potential 
suicide bombers this is void of Islamic legitimacy. According to 
Bernhard Lewis “Der Koran kennt keine Selbstmordattentate” (Die 
Zeit 2004). 
 
This concludes the theoretical perspective which will be employed in the 
following discussion, section 7 ff. 
Recapitulating the main features, I will assert that the psychological mechanisms 
adaptive preference formation, wishful thinking, resentment, inferential errors as 
well as the process of symbolization makes an individual receptive to the jihadi-
Salafi ideology. 
It is argued that the process of symbolization can be found in two different 
editions: the Lasswellian idealtype triggered by structural conditions and one 
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Psychological 
mechanisms 
Instrumental religion 
Symbolization 
Symbolization 
Instrumental 
religion 
Psychological 
mechanisms  2. Symbolization 
Symbolization Instrumental religionPsychological mechanisms1. 
 3. 
fuelled by the jihadi-Salafi ideologists. A consequence is that this mechanism can 
be effective at all three stages illustrated in figure 6.2 below: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Process relation 
 
This is a provisional, ideal type figure. As both Psychological mechanisms and 
the process of symbolization are triggered by socio-economic factors, it is 
probable that they affect individuals simultaneously; thus version 3 might be the 
most accurate description of the topical process. The dual mode of the process 
of symbolization do, however, point in direction of version 2, i.e. the second time 
it appears it is instrumentally utilized. As this do not affect the outcome of the 
process: making people receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology, I will not discuss 
the internal relation of the processes further.  
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7. Mechanisms in context 
The following discussion is subject to the following conditions: 
 
1. As section 4 ff. states, the jihadi-Salafi ideology championed by i.a. Azzam 
and further advanced by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri is 
considered a bold reworking of the Islamic legacy, enabling it to serve a 
distinct political purpose.  
 
2. People in the topical question, refers to persons who are ideologically 
committed to the jihadi-Salafi ideology. It includes, but is not limited to, 
individuals who have sworn loyalty to Osama bin Laden.  
 
The project considers mechanisms triggered by socio-economic factors which 
thus have the potential of affecting the entire population. The character traits 
which predispose some individuals while others are left unaffected are not 
identified. It is however assumed that an in-depth personality assessment would 
reveal individuals who are i.a. socially committed, have a strong sense of justice 
and religiously convinced. Further, the findings in the work of i.a. Sageman 
(2004) establish the significance of social networks and relations when people 
accept the jihadi-Salafists’ call for jihad.  
 
7.1 Psychological mechanisms 
As I hold it probable that the psychological mechanisms prepare the ground for 
the other agents, I will deal with these first.  
 
• What role do psychological mechanisms play in making people 
receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology? 
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The psychological mechanisms considered in this project are resentment caused 
by reversal of status hierarchies, adaptive preference formation, wishful thinking 
and inferential errors.  
 
Resentment caused by reversal of status 
hierarchies 
As the Jihadi-Salafi ideology and its followers target the ”West”, the following 
discussion is limited to the relation between the ‘West’ and the Muslim-Arab 
world.  
There is substantial evidence supporting the validity of the resentment 
mechanism; I hold general socio-economic factors and the foundation of the 
Israeli state as the two most important factors. As the limits of this project prevent 
a further exploration regarding the foundation of the state of Israel, I will confine 
to assert that it altered the situation for the population living in the area today 
known as Israel and the Occupied Territories. Recognizing the fact that acts of 
injustice has been rampant on both sides, I will confine to state that the current 
situation is characterized by overwhelming Israeli superiority. The status 
hierarchies are reversed. The reason why the feeling of resentment is collectively 
applicable to the entire Arab-Muslim world is due to the fact that the area is of 
great religious importance and the European powers’ unjust behavior towards the 
Arab world in the prelude and aftermath of the 1st. World War; manifested 
through i.a. the Sykes-Picot Agreement.  
The following quote of the Tunisian Islamist militant Nizar Trabelsi substantiates 
the notion of the fate of the Palestinian people is an inducement for individuals 
with no apparent personal relations to Palestine.  
 
“The plan was that I would break through the gates at the Kleine Brogel 
army base in a Mercedes delivery van carrying a 100-kilogram bomb and 
crash into the canteen. It would happen between 12:00 and 13:00. 
Between 50 and 70 American soldiers would be eating there at that time. I 
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would place a photo of a Palestinian child killed by the Jews on the van's 
dashboard to remind myself of why I was doing it” (Nesser 2004: 9). 
 
With reference to the sections covering the socio-economic conditions in the 
Middle-East, I find it appropriate to assert that the application of the resentment 
mechanism is justified. This mechanism has two possible outlets, (refer section 
6.1) and I will maintain that the political situation in the Arab-Muslim world incite 
violent behavior. Historically, Islamist insurgencies and Islamist movements have 
been suppressed by the mainly nationalist elites throughout the Arab-Muslim 
world. Their access to political forums, where these are present, has not 
improved significantly. The ongoing elections in Egypt (December 2005) does 
however show that large constituencies are sympathizing with the Islamists as 
independent representatives with ties to the still illegal Muslim Brotherhood have 
received a large number of votes. By banning the Islamists as a whole from the 
political scene there is a significant risk that the radical fringes of the Islamist 
movements will withdraw from society and resort to violence. The jihadi-Salafi 
branch of the Islamist movements is certainly a clear indication of this process.  
In short, the effect of this mechanism can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The reversal of status hierarchies creates a belief of injustice which 
thus accordingly causes a feeling of resentment  
 
2. A desire to change the perceived injustice arises 
 
3. Due to the lack of political channels the change is pursued by means 
of violence 
 
Adaptive preference formation 
This mechanism covers what is also known as the Sour Grapes Syndrome; its 
operation is justified by the following: 
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1. Compared to the western, the Arab-Muslim population is facing 
serious challenges in their everyday life 
 
2. Through modern media and communications systems impressions 
of western and most notably American culture and way of life is 
delivered throughout the Arab-Muslim world 
 
Before I continue, I find it necessary to stress that the justification of the current 
mechanism by no means rest on cultural chauvinism. It is not a question of 
ranking cultures, but rather an objective assessment of the opportunities given 
each person dependent on their birthplace. 
A key element besides measurable factors such as i.a. infant mortality rates, life 
expectancy rates and illiteracy is freedom of choice. The majority of the 
inhabitants in western societies have a set of opportunities which they have a 
reasonable chance of getting fulfilled. Due to the socio-economic and political 
situation in the Arab-Muslim world, the vast majority of the population in this area 
has aspirations which are not satisfied. Even though the image of the “West” as 
depicted by the media is not consistent with reality, this is of minor importance as 
people with firsthand experiences of the indigent in western societies are scarce.  
 
A prerequisite for the application of this mechanism assume the recognition that 
all people desire the freedom of choice; including, but not limited to: education, 
occupation, way of life, recreational activities, place of residence etc. The 
common denominator for all these factors is capital. Aware of the fact that many 
of the regimes in the Arab-Muslim world are both repressive and authoritarian 
limiting civil liberties as a whole, one cannot disregard the fact that if all the 
regimes in this region were transformed into liberal electoral democracies it 
would not change the fact that the vast majority of the population in these states 
nevertheless would lack the funds needed to choose their desired way of life.  
Thus, as the 17-year-old Pakistani described in section 2 realizes he will never 
obtain the standard of living and freedom of choice enjoyed in western societies 
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he is very likely to react as the fox in La Fontaine’s fable and render it 
undesirable. If he does not, provided he has desires that are not satisfied, he 
would find himself in a state of cognitive dissonance.  
In this setting the jihadi-Salafists do not only champion a diametrically opposing 
belief and value system with a strong aversion towards the impious and decadent 
western societies, but also invest him with pride - if he chooses to accept their 
ideology and actions, as they constitute the spear point in the resistance against 
western influence.  
I will thus conclude that the application of the sour grapes syndrome is justified in 
the process of making people receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology.  
 
Wishful thinking 
This mechanism incorporates religious belief. In previous chapters I have 
suggested that religious belief per se is a case of wishful thinking. This will be 
further pursued and elaborated in the following. Before I continue, I find it 
necessary to give a few remarks regarding religious belief and socio-economic 
conditions.  
Most people in the third world are religious believers (Haynes 1998: 15). From 
the 1980s and onward there has been a growth of religio-political movements. 
Haynes (1998) holds the following factors as decisive in the understanding of 
what he describes as a return to religion: 
 
• inconclusive – unsatisfactory modernization 
 
• disillusionment with secular nationalism 
 
• problems of state legitimacy 
 
• political oppression – incomplete national identity 
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• socio-economic grievances 
 
• perceived erosion of traditional morality and values 
 
These factors concur with the situation in the Arab Muslim world. It indicates that 
the growth of religio-political movements, including the jihadi-Salafi, is due to 
certain socio-economic factors.  
 
 
The mechanism of wishful thinking fulfills two purposes in the process of making 
people receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology: 
 
1. It justifies behavior which by universal ethical and moral standards 
is unacceptable 
 
2. It reverses the gain-loss ratio in such a way that dying takes 
precedence of living 
 
The actions advocated and performed by the jihadi-Salafists are of an extreme 
character. Some of their acts will be justified through the principles of ius in bello 
and ius ad bellum. In the minds of the jihadi-Salafists this is however insignificant 
as their actions are justified by Allah. By rendering their actions as divinely 
ordained they effectively exempts them from any other criticism. This is by no 
means a distinct feature of the Islamic faith, as both Judaism and Christianity 
have a long tradition of justifying atrocities as the will of God. The mechanism of 
wishful thinking is a “hot-process”: people adjust their beliefs i.e. that violence is 
divinely ordained, according to their wants i.e. a society governed according to 
the law of God, al-Sha’ria.  
The second purpose this mechanism might fulfill is reversing the gain-loss ratio. 
A person influenced by this mechanism, will feel that his earthly life has no value 
as he is convinced that eternal life awaits him in the next. This effect is most 
evidently observed with, but not limited to, those selected for martyrdom 
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operations. The force of this mechanism is unprecedented, as it will make people 
unaffected the risk of being killed, to the extent that they will have a desire to be 
killed.  
 
“They fought all day when I went to relieve them in the evening the Arabs  
were crying because they wanted to be martyred. They were saying, “I 
must have committed some sin for Allah has not chosen me to go to 
heaven. ”I told them that if they wanted to stay…. And fight then I wasn’t 
going to stop them. The next day they were killed. Osama said later that 
he had told them that the trench was their gate to heaven”(Burke 2004: 
76). 
 
Inferential errors 
The last psychological mechanism to be addressed is inferential errors. In 
section 6.1 I referred to Elster’s observation of the contradiction in on the one 
hand refer to Israel as an omnipotent state and on the other claim that this power 
can be defeated. I will further assert that when the jihadi-Salafists ascribe the 
decline of the Arab-Muslim world to the apostasy of the nationalist leaders and 
claim that by returning to the true path of Islam, the Arab-Muslim world will regain 
its position, it is another case of defective cognitive processing.  
The effects of these inferential errors are twofold: 
 
1. It cements the notion of Israel and thus its allies as the cause of all 
evils, not only the fate of the Palestinian people, but rather an all-
inclusive conspiracy theory which holds Israel responsible for the 
entire world’s misery. 
 
2. Islam and more notably the jihadi-Salafi ideology are projected as the 
only legitimate model of social order.  
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These inferential errors produce irrational beliefs; it simplifies both the cause and 
solution to the challenges the Arab-Muslim world are facing. This said, I 
recognize the possibility of these assertions being part of the jihadi-Salafi 
propaganda toolbox i.e. they are deliberately created and promoted in order to 
further their agenda.  
 
7.2 The process of symbolization 
”The individual who is sorely divided against himself may seek peace by unifying 
himself against an outsider” (Lasswell 1960: 193-194). 
 
Contrary to what present day militant Islamists assert, they are rewriting the past, 
not recovering it. They uphold an image of the Golden Era, denoting the historical 
period when Muhammad walked the earth as the ideal social system. In 
extension of this lies the notion of the immutable Islam and additionally, their 
desire to reintroduce al-Sha’ria as the only source of legislation.  
      
“[…] there is, has been, and always will be only one true Islam, valid “for 
all time and place” (li kull makran wa zaman)” (Brown 2000: 2). 
 
This is the mantra of the radical Islamists, and the basis of their glorification of 
the times of the Prophet and his Companions. This notion is, however, no more 
than “an oft-cited slogan that has rather convincingly been shown to have been 
coined no earlier than the late nineteenth century.” (Ibid: 181 note 4).  
Opposing the Islamists view of the immutable Islam, there is extensive literature 
pointing to its dynamic history8 (Brown 2000: Rashid 2002: Lewis 2002: etc.). 
 
 “[…..] classical Islamic culture adjusted to its environment by producing a 
powerful but limited government. The very durability and dynamism of the 
                                            
8 As section 4.4 establishes the next of kin of the jihadi-Salafists, the reformist Salafists claim that 
the jihadi-Salafists does not follow the ideal of the Prophet as his first priority was to reach unity in 
faith before waging jihad. 
  55
classical Islamic synthesis attests to the strength of the choices made 
(Brown 2000: 67).9 
 
Previous sections have shown that psychological mechanisms are effective in 
the process of making people receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology. In section 
7.1 it is substantiated that i.a. the mechanism of adaptive preference formation is 
operative in the process of making people aversive towards the “West”. I will 
conceptualize this notion further through the application of Harold D. Lasswell’s 
theory of the process of symbolization. Two perspectives will be explored:  
 
The Lasswellian idealtype of the process  
This version is autodynamic, i.e. triggered by socio-economic- and political 
factors. I intend to examine how and to what extent the process of 
symbolization has been effective in the emergence of the jihadi-Salafists deep 
aversion towards the “West”. Seeing that Sayyid Qutb is the most significant 
contributor to their range of ideas, I will initiate the discussion with an 
assessment of the conditions in which Qutb developed his ideas, i.e. 1960s 
Egypt. 
 
 
The propagandistic version 
Resting on the fact that Lasswell rendered the process of symbolization as 
both a powerful factor in social development and for the purpose of 
propaganda I will substantiate that many of the inherent traits of the jihadi-
Salafi ideology is deliberately developed in order to create an abyss between 
“Islam” and the “West”. This version of the process is closely connected with 
the mechanisms of the instrumental utilization of Islam.  
                                            
9 The fate of the Jews in Europe from the 7th century onwards illustrates this point; in Christian 
Europe they were severely persecuted and oppressed, in the Muslim territories however they 
profited from a prosperous cooperation and extensive trade, Jews were also employed within the 
state bureaucracy. 
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Recapitulating the process, it is recognized that the triggering factors are: 
 
1. Disturbing changes in society 
 
2. Populations experiencing traumas 
 
The effect of these factors will thus be:  
 
1. Affects are released from their previous objects 
 
2. Symbols compete to serve as foci of concentration 
 
3. Survival of a few mastersymbols 
 
4. Dichotomization 
 
Today’s jihadi-Salafists are descendants of a long line of radical Islamist reform 
movements (refer section 4). Even though traceable back to the Wahhabi 
tradition and Ibn al Taymiyya in medieval Saudi-Arabia, their primary source of 
inspiration is the Egyptian Muslim Brother, Sayyid Qutb, who exerted himself to 
create an abyss between his band of followers and the Egyptian nationalist elites.  
This was done by labeling his own times as Jahiliyya and everyone else, except 
his band of followers, as kufr.  
The impetus of Qutb’s work was socio-economical grievances, including the 
dissolution of the Caliphate, the foundation of the state of Israel and hence the 
reversal of status hierarchies. Throughout the Muslim-Arab world nationalist 
regimes had succeeded the European colonial powers, but were unable to 
address the socio-economical challenges and were void of credibility. 
Qutb’s message and solution was straightforward: rearrange society according to 
the injunctions set forth in the Qur’an. The cogency and persuasive force of his 
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ideas rests on the fact that it strikes the very heart of the collective Muslim-Arab 
identity; all that is good and just became vested in the symbol of Islam, while the 
nationalist elites became the symbol of everything evil and unjust.  
Due to the unresolved socio-economic grievances and lack of freedom in the 
Middle-East, these sentiments have been latent in the Arab-Muslim population 
ever since. With varying force and credibility they have emerged to the surface 
manifested through Islamist insurgencies.  
Today the jihadi-Salafists are the most vigorous advocates of these sentiments, 
their scope is however much wider than that of Qutb’s. As they consider the 
Arab-Muslim states as puppet regimes controlled by the west, they have shifted 
their focus from the “Lesser evil” onto the “Greater Evil”, denoting their domestic 
regimes and the “west” respectively.  
Moving on to the possible instrumental utilization of the process I will assert that 
this is most evident in their reference to the Golden Era of Islam, refer section 4 
for an elaboration of this notion. The consequences of this range of thoughts are 
far reaching as it paves the way for the concept of the immutable Islam and thus 
their desire for creating a society governed according to the al-Sha’ria. It is 
possibly a deliberate strategy aimed to coerce Muslims into accepting the jihadi-
Salafists’ range of ideas. The success and cogency of this strategy rests on the 
fact that those affected by it will feel that by dismissing the notion of the Golden 
Era and its implications, they are dismissing the very heart of the Islamic legacy.  
The implications of the topical process can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. By upholding the medieval society of Muhammad as the only 
legitimate social system, the process of symbolization, whether 
autodynamic or instrumental, cements the jihadi-Salafists dogmatic 
belief of the excellence of Muhammad’s Umma.  
 
2. Exploiting the collective Arab-Muslim culture, identity and heritage, 
they aim at presenting their ideology as the only true Islamic and 
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thus repel all other social systems and ideologies, whether temporal 
or spiritual.  
 
7.3 Instrumental utilization of Islam 
Resting on section 4 I will discuss the notion of the jihadi-Salafists exploiting 
Islam in order to further their political agenda.  
Possibly limited to the revelationist religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam, this 
is by no means a new approach towards religion; it is rather the rule than the 
exception. As keepers and administers of the will of God the clergy have had and 
still have a tremendous influence on the vast majority of the worlds’ population. 
By abusing their position as spiritual guides they have unsurpassed opportunities 
of directing, possibly coercing people into irrational behavior.  
 
In figure 6.2 Process Relation I suggested three possible versions, all of which 
placed the Instrumental use of religion last in the chain. Previous sections have 
established that the socio-economic conditions in the Arab-Muslim world 
predispose people towards the sentiments of the jihadi-Salafists. Exposed to the 
Jihadi-Salafi ideology they are thus more inclined to accept its radical 
interpretations and take part in their extremist behavior.  
 
My main focus is on their radicalized concept of jihad as this legitimizes their 
militant behavior. As illustrated in figure 6.1 The ideological logic of jihad and 
table 6.1 Traditional vs. radical application, the jihadi-Salafists’ attitude towards 
the concept of jihad display the inconsistencies within their ideology and hence 
the instrumental utilization with all possible clarity. I substantiate this notion with 
reference to the following facts: 
The jihadi-Salafists claim that their version of Islam is the only legitimate, ‘pure’ 
version - untampered by exegesis. As section 4.3 ff.  points out, the following do 
however indicate instrumental utilization: 
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1. The reworking of the term Jahiliyya 
 
2. Defining fellow Muslims as kufr 
 
3. The use of suicide attackers and the labeling of these as martyrs 
 
The preceding sections have substantiated that both psychological mechanisms 
and the process of symbolization are effective in the process of making Muslims 
in the Middle-East receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology and their incentives. I.e. 
they have adapted to and accepted the Salafists’ dogmatic worldview. As 
denoted previously, I hold these two mechanisms to be vital i.a. in the process of 
making people antagonistic towards the west and what is regarded as corrupt 
and impious Muslim regimes. However, when explaining the militant behavior of 
the jihadi-Salafists it is necessary to include their instrumental utilization of 
religion.  
The implications of their reworking of the concept and justification of jihad can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. By rendering their cause and actions as religiously ordained, they are, in 
the eyes of the believer, not only effectively eluding universally ethical and 
normative principles, but transforming them into a religious imperative. 
Consequently, a person who neglects to abide by the jihadi-Salafi ideology 
is defying the will of Allah. 
 
2. Fighting in the name of Allah to further his commandments is an 
unsurpassed morale booster. The determination of a person who is 
fighting a battle on the grounds of religious inducements will be 
unparalleled. This notion rests on the fact that it reverses the gain-loss 
ratio in such a way that the person will feel that he has more to loose by 
not risking his life in combat, i.e. face the consequences of rejecting the 
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will of Allah. The specific case of suicide missions pins down this irrational 
logic even further:  
 
The acceptance of a suicide mission does not only imply that the gain-loss 
ratio is reversed, but a prohibited action is turned into an imperative. 
 
7.4 Implications 
Based on the previous discussion, it is justified that the agents covered are vital 
in the understanding of the gravitation towards jihadi-Salafism.  
It appears evident that the socio-economic conditions in the Arab-Muslim world 
predispose individuals to the radical Salafi ideology. The applied psychological 
mechanisms hold the capacity of distorting a person’s beliefs and desires in such 
a way as to render them irrational. It is also substantiated that the autodynamic 
version of the process of symbolization is an appropriate approach when 
assessing the extreme aversion towards the “West”. Both of these mechanisms 
are triggered by socio-economic factors, and one should expect to find variants 
of these in societies marked by restrictions on the civil and political liberties and 
socio-economic grievances.  
In the Middle-East however, these mechanisms do not only make people 
susceptible to the jihadi-Salafi ideology, but as the effects of the mechanisms 
coincide with the incentives of the Salafi ideology they also justify their existence.  
In this situation, the Salafists’ instrumental utilization of Islam is exploiting the 
collective Arab-Muslim heritage; making all Muslims hostage to their radical 
amendments. By virtue of championing their ideology as the only legitimate and 
true Islamic, utilizing the deficient socio-economic conditions and promoting their 
universal magic of the Golden Era paradigm:  
 
the cause of the collective Muslim misfortune is due to their straying away 
from the “right path”, the remedial measure is to rearrange society 
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according to the first Muslim society established by Muhammad in Medina 
in 632. 
 
As previously discussed the implications of this policy are far-reaching and will 
inevitably produce an authoritarian theocracy. The force of the jihadi-Salafists’ 
method, as touched upon previously, is vested in the fact that all devout Muslims 
will need to assess their exegesis. It is a possibility that the jihadi-Salafi ideology 
represent the true will of Allah, if so, not acting according to the jihadi-Salafi 
ideology will imply defying the word of God.  
Consequently, as the prevailing structural conditions have the potential for 
making people receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology, their reworking of traditional 
Islamic concepts and by rendering their policies as Godly ordained they have 
created an opinion-forming instrument of unprecedented force.  
 
8.0 Closing remarks 
I set out to map possible mechanisms leading people into jihadi-Salafism. The 
focus has been on three different, but interconnected mechanisms: various 
psychological mechanism, the process of symbolization and the instrumental 
utilization of religion. The gravitation towards jihadi-Salafism has been viewed 
through the grid of rational choice theory, and even though no definitive 
conclusions have been made, it has been substantiated that the socio-economic 
situation in the Arab-Muslim world hold the capacity of distorting a persons 
beliefs and desires in such a way as to make him susceptible to the jihadi-Salafi 
ideology. In order to positively identify the psychological mechanisms as 
triggering factors one would have to carry out in-depth psychological interviews10 
of individuals ascribing to the Salafi ideology. The probability of finding 
appropriate interviewees seems, however, minimal as the circumstances under 
which the detainees are held in “western” captivity is most unsuited for viable 
                                            
10 Recent exposures of the fallibility of court-appointed psychological experts do however render 
such activities uncertain; psychology is heavily dependent on cognitive processing and will thus 
remain a science exempt of absolutes. 
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psychological examinations. I have moreover deliberately avoided “Real Politik 
incentives”, e.g. the demands set forth in Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of War 
against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, the jihadi-
Salafists recurring reference to the dubious, inconsequent, hypocritical western 
powers and the ongoing human rights violations performed by the state of Israel, 
which are indisputable. According to the jihadi-Salafists, these acts justify the 
application of the defensive jihadi doctrine: Islamic territories are attacked by 
infidel forces, thus Allah require all who is capable to partake in the jihad.  
The extremism of the jihadi-Salafists’ actions, including idealized suicide and the 
Godly ordained killing of civilians, as well as the writer’s conviction that violent 
behavior per se is irrational, necessitates the notion of psychological 
mechanisms as conditioning the Instrumental use of Religion and the Process of 
Symbolization. Although the mechanisms included by no means paint the whole 
picture I find it to be a viable framework and conceptualization for understanding 
why Muslims in the Middle-East are receptive to the jihadi-Salafi ideology.  
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